american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng\_harness) [explore] {0}

- overall results cycles done : 15 total paths : 703 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0

# Modern Fuzzing Research & Engineering

ath geometry

Andrea Fioraldi <u>@andreafioraldi</u> 506/1.05M, 193/1 0/0, 0/0 19.25%/53.2k, n/a What is Fuzz Testing?

Fuzz Testing, or Fuzzing, is a **family** of "Software" Testing techniques that involves providing machine-generated inputs to the System Under Test (SUT) in order to satisfy **some objectives**.

What is Fuzz Testing?

Fuzz Testing, or Fuzzing, is a **family** of "Software" Testing techniques that involves providing machine-generated inputs to the System Under Test (SUT) in order to satisfy **some objectives**. What is Fuzz Testing? Machine-generated inputs can be of any kind, beyond the classic definition of "unexpected" (by the way, what does it means?) inputs. What is Fuzz Testing?

Machine-generated inputs can be of any kind, beyond the classic definition of "unexpected" (by the way, what does it means?) inputs. Fuzzing is often considered related to Random Testing, a technique that provides inputs sampled uniform independently from the input space (using a specification maybe, so they are not random bytes in general).

bit flips : n/a, n/a, n/a byte flips : n/a, n/a, n/a arithmetics : n/a, n/a, n/a known ints : n/a, n/a, n/a dictionary : n/a, n/a, n/a navoc/splice : 506/1.05M, 193/1.44M py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a path geometry ---levels : 11 pending : 121 pend fav : 0 wn finds : 699 imported : n/a stability : 99.88% What is Fuzz Testing?

Machine-generated inputs can be of any kind, beyond the classic definition of "unexpected" (by the way, what does it means?) inputs. Fuzzing is often considered related to Random Testing, a technique that provides inputs sampled uniform independently from the input space (using a specification maybe, so they are not random bytes in general).

But Fuzzing can generate inputs deterministically, or can generate inputs mutating previously generated inputs that makes the sampling from the input space not independent.

avoc/splice : 506/1.05M, 193/1.44M py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a Widely discussed SOTA Fuzzing in 2022 Feedback-driven, mainly Coverage-guided 

Widely discussed SOTA Fuzzing in 2022 Feedback-driven, mainly Coverage-guided Can bypass coverage roadblocks (concolic-aided, taint-assisted, lacksquareRedQueen, ...) if (input == 0xabadcafe) { interesting\_code();

Widely discussed SOTA Fuzzing in 2022 Feedback-driven, mainly Coverage-guided Can bypass coverage roadblocks (concolic-aided, taint-assisted, RedQueen, ...) Input models help to fuzz deeper <start> ::= <expr> <expr> \_ ::= <term> + <expr> | <term> - <expr> | <term> / <expr> | <term> / <expr> | <term> / <expr> / <expr
 / <ex <term> ::= <term> \* <factor> | <term> / <factor> | <factor> | <factor> ::= +<factor> | -<factor> | (<expr>) | <integer> <integer>.<integer> <integer> ::= <digit><integer> | <digit> <digit> ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9

n : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a

Merican fuzzy lop
Widely discussed SOTA Fuzzing in 2022
Feedback-driven, mainly Coverage-guided

• Can bypass coverage roadblocks (concolic-aided, taint-assisted,

RedQueen, ...)

• Input models help to fuzz deeper

• Can test network interactions



Widely discussed SOTA Fuzzing in 2022 Feedback-driven, mainly Coverage-guided Can bypass coverage roadblocks (concolic-aided, taint-assisted, lacksquareRedQueen, ...) Input models help to fuzz deeper Can test network interactions Can fuzz userspace programs, kernel, hypervisors, ... 

Widely used tools in 2022

ast uniq crash : <mark>none seen yet</mark> last uniq hang : <mark>none seen yet</mark>

now processing : 261\*:

- overall results cycles done : 15 total paths : 703 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0

# google/honggfuzz

Security oriented software fuzzer. Supports evolutionary, feedback-driven fuzzing based on code coverage (SW and HW based)

 A
 68
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 17
 ☆
 3k
 ♀
 492

 Contributors
 Issues
 Stars
 Forks

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uzzel

pencified : 699 own finds : 699 imported : n/a stability : 99.88

cpu000: 12%



Yes, even in heavily-fuzzed projects in OSS-Fuzz

american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng harness) [explore]

process timin

# Still finding these bugs by hand...

# Project Zero

News and updates from the Project Zero team at Google

### Wednesday, December 1, 2021

## This shouldn't have happened: A vulnerability postmortem

Posted by Tavis Ormandy, Project Zero

### Introduction

This is an unusual blog post. I normally write posts to highlight some hidden attack surface or interesting complex vulnerability class. This time, I want to talk about a vulnerability that is neither of those things. The striking thing about this vulnerability is just how simple it is. This should have been caught earlier, and I want to explore why that didn't happen.

In 2021, all good bugs need a catchy name, so I'm calling this one "BigSig".

First, let's take a look at the bug, I'll explain how I found it and then try to understand why we missed it for so long.

american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng harness) [explore

process timina

# Still finding these bugs by hand...

## ing a none see

Issue 2272: libxml2: heap-buffer-overflow in xmlBufAdd Reported by fwilhelm@google.com on Tue, Mar 8, 2022, 4:19 PM GMT+1

Project Member

libxml2 is vulnerable to a heap-buffer-overflow when xmlBufAdd is called on a very large buffer:

### int

xmlBufAdd(xmlBufPtr buf, const xmlChar \*str, int len) {
 unsigned int needSize;

### [..]

needSize = buf->use + len + 2; (A) if (needSize > buf->size){

### [..]

if (!xmlBufResize(buf, needSize)){
 xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "growing buffer");
 return XML\_ERR\_NO\_MEMORY;

### eam at Google

## A vulnerability postmortem

s to highlight some hidden attack surface or interesting lk about a vulnerability that is neither of those things. The nple it is. This should have been caught earlier, and I want

In 2021, all good bugs need a catchy name, so I'm calling this one "BigSig".

First, let's take a look at the bug, I'll explain how I found it and then try to understand why we missed it for so long.

dictionary : n/a, n/a, n/ navoc/splice : 506/1.05M, 1 py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 19.25%/53.2k

Why? which is a days, o hrs, o make the base of the ba	
<ul> <li>Fuzzers often tests only the determinant</li> </ul>	efault configuration
• Fuzzers have input length limi <sup>.</sup>	map density : 5.78% / 13.98% tsount coverage : 3.30 bits/tuple
<ul> <li>Code coverage as feedback is no</li> </ul>	ot enough 114 (16.22%) 167 (23.76%)

Why? Fuzzers often tests only the default configuration Fuzzers have input length limits Code coverage as feedback is not enough (beware of path explosion!)  $\bullet$ Fioraldi, D'Elia, Balzarotti. "The Use of Likely Invariants as Feedback for Fuzzers" Mantovani, Fioraldi, Balzarotti. "Fuzzing with Data Dependency Information" Herrera, Payer, Hosking. "DATAFLOW - Towards a Data-Flow-Guided Fuzzer"

An Example int wavlike\_msadpcm\_init (SF\_PRIVATE \*psf, int blockalign, int samplesperblock) MSADPCM\_PRIVATE \*pms; unsigned int pmssize ; 0000 pmssize = sizeof (MSADPCM\_PRIVATE) + blockalign + 3 \* psf->sf.channels \* samplesperblock pms->samples = pms->dummydata ; // array in pms pms->block = (unsigned char\*) (pms->dummydata + psf->sf.channels \* samplesperblock) ; pms->channels = psf->sf.channels ; pms->blocksize = blockalign ;

An Example		
<pre>int wavlike_msadpcm_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf;</pre>	, int blockalign,	int samplesperblock)
{ MSADPCM_PRIVATE *pms ; unsigned int pmssize ;	map dens count cover	sity : 5.78% / 13.98% age : 3.30 bits/tuple
<pre>pmssize = sizeof (MSADPCM_PRIVATE) + blo ;  pms-&gt;samples = pms-&gt;dummydata ; // arra pms-&gt;block = (unsigned char*) (pms-&gt;c pms-&gt;chappelo = paf saf chappelo ;</pre>	ockalign + 3 * ps ay in pms dummydata + psf->	<pre>f-&gt;sf.channels * samplesperblock sf.channels * samplesperblock) ;</pre>
pms->blocksize = blockalign ;		
byte flips : n/a, n/a, n/a arithmetics : n/a, n/a, n/a known ints : n/a, n/a, n/a dictionary : n/a, n/a, n/a avoc/splice : 506/1.05M, 193/1.44M		

An Example static int msadpcm\_decode\_block (SF\_PRIVATE \*psf, MSADPCM\_PRIVATE \*pms) sampleindx = 2 \* pms->channels ; while (blockindx < pms->blocksize) bytecode = pms->block [blockindx++] ; pms->samples [sampleindx++] = (bytecode >> 4) & 0x0F ; // heap overflow bug pms->samples [sampleindx++] = bytecode & 0x0F ;

An Example static int msadpcm\_decode\_block (SF\_PRIVATE \*psf, MSADPCM\_PRIVATE \*pms) sampleindx = 2 \* pms->channels ; while (blockindx < pms->blocksize) bytecode = pms->block [blockindx++] ; pms->samples [sampleindx++] = (bytecode >> 4) & 0x0F ; // heap overflow bug pms->samples [sampleindx++] = bytecode & 0x0F ;

This only happens when the program is in a specific state, characterized by a small allocation size for the pms buffer and a pms->blocksize value sufficiently high to force the loop to write out of the bounds of the array.

However, none of these requirements can be extracted from code coverage, as there are no branches in the program that involve these thresholds

An Example pmssize = sizeof (MSADPCM\_PRIVATE) + blockalign + 3 \* psf->sf.channels \* samplesperblock



Invariant	Condition
LI <sub>1</sub>	blockalign $\in$ {0,2,256}
$LI_2$	blockalign <
	samplesperblock

Invariant	A	В	С	D
$LI_1$	1	×	1	×
$LI_2$	×	×	1	1

88%

Why?ew path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 43 sec last unig crash : none seen yet	
<ul> <li>Fuzzers often tests only the default configur</li> </ul>	ration uniq hangs : 0
<ul> <li>Fuzzers have input length limits</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Code coverage as feedback is not enough</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Harnessing to cover all the code is hard (esp</li> </ul>	pecially for devs)

Why? Harnessing to cover all the code is hard (especially for devs) We can generate them automatically Ispoglou, Austin, Mohan, Payer. "FuzzGen: Automatic Fuzzer Generation" Babić, Bucur, Chen, Ivančić, King, Lemieux, Szekeres, Wang. "FUDGE: Fuzz Driver Generation at Scale"

Why? days o hrs. 0	
<ul> <li>Harnessing to cover all the co</li> </ul>	ode is hard (especially for devs)
$\circ$ We can generate them automatically	<pre>map density : 5.78% / 13.98% count coverage : 3.30 bits/tuple findings in docth</pre>
$\circ$ We need introspection of what the	fuzzer can cover
Fuzz Introspector ( <u>https://gi</u>	<pre>ithub.com/ossf/fuzz-introspector)</pre>

Lub, Sun time : 0 days, 0					
WNY few path : 0 days, 0					
😁 File Edit View Tools Window H	-bosmbround	tı — Binary Ninja			
Symbols III III	ida64.bndb (PE Graph) :: boombox.bndb (PE Graph) ::	Coverage Overview			
<ul> <li>Harnessing to sub_140001140</li> </ul>	t64_t sub_1400012b0(void* arg1) Disassembly *	Cov % Func Name	Address - Blocks		
Sub 140001210	5 35155	0.00 sub_140001000	0x140001000 0 /	0/d	32 1
sub_140001250		0.00 sub_140001030	0x140001030 0 / :	3 0 / 12	35 4
sub_1400012b0	a man	69.57 sub_140001060	08010001080 5 /	.C 3Z / 46	149 6
	a sheet and the	0.00 #15_140001100	0x140001100 0 / 1	0 / 17	72 4
• We can genera sub_140001b20	7 SL	0.00 sub 1400011+0	0x140001120 0 / 1	0 / 15	46 2
sub_140001ed0	2 217 Contraction of Lands	0.00 sub_140001210	0x140001210 0 /	a o/a	26 1
sub 14882868		0.00 #ub_140001230	0x140001230 0 /	0 / 10	29 1
Ille need intro sub_140882268		0.00 sub_140001250	0x140001250 0 /	0 / 23	81 3
	A Contraction of the Contraction	65.84 sub_1400012b0	Da140001280 17 /	19 191 / 215	1074 0
sub_140882568	E 2000 2 200 million	77.05 mub_1400016f0	Caleccolero 11./	.5 96 / 122	562 7
State 140002700	S 2222	64.95 mm_140001930	0#140001930 4 /	.0 79 / 93	482 5
	E S C Sector V France V	59.42 sub_140001b20	Dw140001820 11 / 1	.6 93 / 106	495 0
Sub_1400029d0	A TOTAL	\$2.96 sub_140001d10	C#140001D10 11 /	4 68 / 105	446 6
sub_140882a68 sub_140882af8		43.75 mut_140001ad0	0#140001200 7 / 0	.5 42 / 96	393 6
sub_140802b50		10002000	02140002060 7 /	40 / 25	260 2
sub_140082bf8		28.32 mm 140002260	0+140002240 11 /	10 07 / 05	676 D
sub_140083280		54.43 auto 140002420	D#140002420 (8 /	43 / 79	358
sub_140003820	1 21/20	100.00 mmb 140002590	0x340002580 4 /	6 62 / 62	322 3
5ymbols Tags		0.00 sub_1400026e0	0x140002620 0 /	a o/a	28 1
Cross References 1910	<b>5</b> 220	0.00 sub_140002700	0x140002700 0 /	0 / 53	157 5
+ Filter (1)		75.05 mub_1400027c0	Ca1400027C0 14 /	.9 44 / 92	266 9
Dr. * Address	E Elementer Elementer Elementer	35.29 mub_140002840			247 5
<b>140003a</b> 37		65.35 mub_140002940			5T 3
arithmetics : n/a. 🎽		65.35 sub_140002a60	0m140002380 4 /	4 17 / 24	5T 3
		0.00 sub_140002af0	0x140002AF0 0 / :	. 0 / 17	51 1
known ints : n/a.		100.00 mib 140002550	0x140002350 1./	31 / 31	145 1
		Composez		* - 65.2*	+ - Aggregate -
otettonary . II/a,		Selection	: 0x1400012b0 to 0x1400012b2 (0	x2 bytes) PE *	Graph • Options •

cpu000: 12%

Beyond memory corruption bugs

# A SQL injection is not causing a segfault in your application

Several paths are SOTA Differential fuzzing Cryptofuzz (https://github.com/guidovranken/cryptofuzz) Maier, Fäßler, Seifert. "Uncovering Smart Contract VM Bugs Via Differential Fuzzing"

Several paths are SOTA

- Differential fuzzing
  - Cryptofuzz (<u>https://github.com/guidovranken/cryptofuzz</u>)
  - Maier, Fäßler, Seifert. "Uncovering Smart Contract VM Bugs Via Differential Fuzzing"
- Custom bug detectors
  - Handwritten bug detectors, useful for memory safe languages (e.g. Java <a href="https://www.code-intelligence.com/blog/log4j-bug-detectors">https://www.code-intelligence.com/blog/log4j-bug-detectors</a>)
  - Custom sanitizers (e.g. <u>https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=49053</u>)
     Mining invariants and automatic insertion of assertions

     Daikon, Purify, ...

py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng\_harness) [explore]

# Several paths are SOTA

- Differential fuzzing
  - Cryptofuzz (<u>https://github.com/guidovra</u>)
  - Maier, Fäßler, Seifert. "Uncovering Sm; vulnerability which was just fixed: Fuzzing"
  - Custom bug detectors
    - Handwritten bug detectors, useful for r https://www.code-intelligence.com/blog,
    - Custom sanitizers (e.g.
      - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/i
      - Mining invariants and automatic insert:
    - Daikon, Purify, ...3/1 44M



Proof that fuzzing can discover exploitable vulnerabilities that aren't memory corruption! OSS-Fuzz discovered a very interesting command injection vulnerability which was just fixed:

## syoyo/tinygltf

## #368 Command injection via wordexp call.



oliverchang opened on August 16, 2022

### github.com

Command injection via wordexp call. • Issue #368 • syoyo/tinygltf Describe the issue This is a security vulnerability. The wordexp call here allows arbitrary code execution tinygltf/tiny\_gltf.h Line 2640 in 0fa56e2 int ret = ...



0

%

Can we do better? Improve invariants mining, the coverage problem causes too many false positive and locally valid constraints unsuitable for fuzzing

Can we do better? Improve invariants mining, the coverage problem causes too many false positive and locally valid constraints unsuitable for fuzzing Build large databases of bug patters (?) lacksquare

Can we do better? Improve invariants mining, the coverage problem causes too many false positive and locally valid constraints unsuitable for fuzzing Build large databases of bug patters (?) Maybe it's time to start approaching program analysis problems with ML without the "wanna find something to apply this model" bias

cpu000: **12%** 

Wanna build a fuzzer and compare with the others?

Good luck.

# Problem: Fuzzers Fragmentation



Cause: Monolithic Codebases Fuzzers are  $\Rightarrow$  Designed to be tools  $\Rightarrow$  Not designed with code reuse in mind  $\Rightarrow$  Hard to extend Many fuzzers are incompatible forks of others (usually AFL) This makes them incompatible with orthogonal techniques

How to Create a Fuzzer Then? Fork an existing fuzzer (the n-th AFL-something) Create a custom fuzzer from scratch 

rim : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a

cpu000: 12%

Custom Fuzzer Engineering Issues Lack of code reuse, you will have to spend a lot of time in  $\bullet$ adapting different techniques from different fuzzers

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Custom Fuzzer Engineering Issues Lack of code reuse, you will have to spend a lot of time in  $\bullet$ adapting different techniques from different fuzzers Reinventing the wheel, you will code the same code to do that same thing that all others do again and again Naive design, typically just a mutator 

Custom Fuzzer Engineering Issues Lack of code reuse, you will have to spend a lot of time in Ø adapting different techniques from different fuzzers Reinventing the wheel, you will code the same code to do that same thing that all others do again and again Naive design, typically just a mutator Scaling, you cannot adapt it easily to multi-core or -machine 



american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng\_harness) [explore] {0}

What? time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 43 sec ast uniq crash : none seen yet — overall results – cycles done : 15 total paths : 703 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0

LibAFL is a library for fuzzers that are

Fast (low IPC, runtime overhead)
 Scalable (almost linearly to 200+ cores)

- Portable (Android, Windows, MacOS, Linux, Kernels, ...)
- State-of-the-Art (Hybrid-, Grammar-, Token-, Feedback-Fuzzing)
- Multi-instrumentation (binary-only Frida & Qemu, Clang, Python,...)

And, most importantly, very extendable with your own components.

arithmetics : n/a, n/a, n/a known ints : n/a, n/a, n/a dictionary : n/a, n/a, n/a navoc/splice : 506/1.05M, 193/1.44M py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a pend fav : 0
own finds : 699
imported : n/a
stability : 99.88%

<pre>american fuzzy lop ++2.65d ( process timing run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 r last last MattGorko/</pre>	<pre>(libpng_harness) [explore] {0} overall results overall results cycles done : 15 total paths : 703 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0</pre>
<b>Tartiflette</b> Snapshot fuzzing with KVM and LibAFL	<pre>insity : 5.78% / 13.98% ierage : 3.30 bits/tuple in depth</pre>
우 2 ⓒ 0 ☆ 67 양 5 Contributors Issues Stars Forks	<pre>aths : 114 (16.22%) s on : 167 (23.76%) shes : 0 (0 unique) outs : 0 (0 unique)</pre>
<pre>- fuzzing strategy yields bit flips : n/a, n/a, n/a byte flips : n/a, n/a, n/a arithmetics : n/a, n/a, n/a known ints : n/a, n/a, n/a dictionary : n/a, n/a, n/a havoc/splice : 506/1.05M, 193/1.44M</pre>	path geometry levels : 11 pending : 121 pend fav : 0 own finds : 699 imported : n/a stability : 99.88%

american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng\_harness) [expl process timing \_\_\_\_\_\_ ov

# MattGorko/ Tartiflette



- overall results cycles done : 15 total paths : 703 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0

sity : 5.78% / 13.98% rage : 3.30 bits/tuple

२२ २ Contrik

Snapsho

epi052/feroxfuzz

A structure-aware HTTP fuzzing library

22	1	<u></u> 1		0	ę	0
	Contributor	19	ssue	Stars		Forks

506/1.05M, 193/1.44M 0/0, 0/0 19.25%/53.2k, n/a



cpu000: 12%

tlspuffin/tlspuffin MattGorko/ A symbolic-model-guided fuzzer for TLS **Tartiflette** Snapsho 83 2 57 62 6  $\square$ epi052 83 2 Contributors Stars Forks Issues Contrik

exec fuzzing str bit flips byte flips arithmetics known ints dictionary havoc/splice py/custom





We don't know. Really, we can only speculate about this.

<ul> <li>Current benchmarkin</li> <li>Code coverage over time</li> </ul>	g metrics
<ul> <li>Bugs over time</li> <li>Speed</li> <li>CVEs found (lol)</li> <li>Reached coverage for each fuzz</li> </ul>	<pre>coverage     findings in depth     favored paths 114 (16.22%)     findings in depth     favored paths 114 (16.22%)     findings in depth     favored paths 167 (23.76%)     for (23.76%)     for (ase (not so used, IMO useful to</pre>
benchmark structured mutators)	

## cpu000: **12%**

# Standard benchmarks ATM

overall results – cycles done : 15 total paths : 703 unig crashes : 0

# FuzzBench: Fuzzer Benchmarking As a Service

FuzzBench is a free service that evaluates fuzzers on a wide variety of real-world benchmarks, at Google scale. The goal of FuzzBench is to make it painless to rigorously evaluate fuzzing research and make fuzzing research easier for the community to adopt. We invite members of the research community to contribute their fuzzers and give us feedback on improving our evaluation techniques.

FuzzBench provides:

- An easy API for integrating fuzzers.
- Benchmarks from real-world projects. FuzzBench can use any OSS-Fuzz project as a benchmark.
- A reporting library that produces reports with graphs and statistical tests to help you understand the significance of results.

To participate, submit your fuzzer to run on the FuzzBench platform by following our simple guide. After your integration is accepted, we will run a large-scale experiment using your fuzzer and generate a report comparing your fuzzer to others, such as AFL and libFuzzer. See a sample report.

# Standard benchmarks ATM

cplore {0}
overall results cycles done : 15
total paths : 703
inig crashes : 0

# Magma: A Ground-Truth Fuzzing Benchmark

Magma is a collection of open-source libraries with widespread usage and a long history of securitycritical bugs and vulnerabilities. In light of the need for better fuzzer evaluation, we *front-ported* bugs from previous bug reports to the latest versions of these libraries.

For each ported bug, we added in-line (source-code-level) instrumentation to collect ground-truth information about bugs **reached** (buggy code executed) and **triggered** (fault condition satisfied by input). This instrumentation allows a monitoring utility to measure fuzzer progress in real time.

Magma also includes the **captain** toolset which facilitates the process of building Magma targets and running campaigns.

Check out a sample Magma report and read the paper. Questions, comments, and feedback are welcome!



generate a report comparing your fuzzer to others, such as AFL and libFuzzer. See a sample report.

: 19.25%/53.2k, n/

000: 12

• More representative bugs	
<ul> <li>"Automated Magma"</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Changing often the targets (m overfitting</li> <li>Decent synthetic bugs?</li> </ul>	aybe from OSSFuzz) to avoid

Can we improve?	
<ul> <li>More representative bugs</li> </ul>	
• "Automated Magma"	
<ul> <li>Changing often the targets (ma overfitting</li> </ul>	ybe from OSSFuzz) to avoid
<ul> <li>Decent synthetic bugs?</li> </ul>	

Can we improve?

overall results cycles done : 15 total paths : 703

31<sup>st</sup> USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM

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# FIXREVERTER: A Realistic Bug Injection Methodology for Benchmarking Fuzz Testing

### Authors:

Zenong Zhang and Zach Patterson, University of Texas at Dallas; Michael Hicks, University of Maryland and Amazon; Shiyi Wei, University of Texas at Dallas

### Distinguished Paper Award Winner

#### Abstract:

Fuzz testing is an active area of research with proposed improvements published at a rapid pace. Such proposals are assessed empirically: Can they be shown to perform better than the status quo? Such an assessment requires a benchmark of target programs with well-identified, realistic bugs. To ease the construction of such a benchmark, this paper presents FIXREVERTER, a tool that automatically injects realistic bugs in a program. FIXREVERTER takes as input a bugfix pattern which contains both code syntax and semantic conditions. Any code site that matches the specified syntax is undone if the semantic conditions are satisfied, as checked by static analysis, thus (re)introducing a likely bug. This paper focuses on three bugfix patterns, which we call conditional-abort, conditional-execute, and conditional-assign, based on a study of fixes in a corpus of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). Using FIXREVERTER we have built REVBUGBENCH, which consists of 10 programs into which we have injected nearly 8,000 bugs; the programs are taken from FuzzBench and Binutils, and represent common targets of fuzzing evaluations. We have integrated REVBUGBENCH into the FuzzBench service, and used it to evaluate five fuzzers. Fuzzing performance varies by fuzzer and program, as desired/expected. Overall, 219 unique bugs were reported, 19% of which were detected by just one fuzzer.

38%



There's a paper about it, problem solved.

american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng\_harness) [explore]

# Re-implementing things is hard

: none seen yet

• Development cost and maintenance

Re-implementing things is hard
Development cost and maintenance

• Re-evaluate techniques to decide if the improvement worths the

s effort ess	

Re-implementing things is hard Development cost and maintenance Re-evaluate techniques to decide if the improvement worths the effort Can we do better simply buying more core? lacksquare

cpu000: **12%** 

american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng\_harness) [explore] {0}

# Re-implementing things is *k*

- Development cost and maintenance
- Re-evaluate techniques to decide if the impr

effort



Can we do hetter simply huving more core?



Re-implementing things is hard
Development cost and maintenance

- Re-evaluate techniques to decide if the improvement worths the effort
- Can we do better simply buying more core?
- Lack of production-ready engines for tracing/instrumentation of

bit exotic targets /a, n/a byte flips : n/a, n/a, n/a arithmetics : n/a, n/a, n/a known ints : n/a, n/a, n/a dictionary : n/a, n/a, n/a navoc/splice : 506/1.05M, 193/1.44M py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng harness) [explore] {0]

process timina

Hard targets

ייכייאכננמו, עאט, אנצכטונמעטוכאא ומוועכ נון, ar->name = "ld preload fuzz.so"; calc\_address\_range(ar); tf(ar->found){ hprintf("[init] ld\_preload library mapped at:\t0x%016lx-0x%016lx\n", ar->start, ar->end); hprintf("[init] target region \t0x%016lx-0x%016lx (IP0)\n", ar->ip0\_a, ar->ip0\_b); hprintf("[init] library region \t0x%016lx-0x%016lx (IP1)\n", ar->ip1\_a, ar->ip1\_b); uint64\_t\* ranges = malloc(sizeof(uint64\_t)\*3); memset(ranges, 0x0, sizeof(uint64\_t)\*3); if(get\_harness\_state()->pt\_auto\_addr\_range\_a){ ranges[0] = ar->ip0\_a; ranges[1] = ar->ip0\_b; ranges[0] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF6000; ranges[1] = 0xffffffffffffff001; ranges[2] = 0;/\* submit the address ranges for IPT tracing even if our target has compile-time instrumentations \*/ kAFL hypercall(HYPERCALL KAFL RANGE SUBMIT, (uintptr\_t)ranges); if(get harness state()->pt auto addr range b){ ranges[0] = ar->ip1 a; ranges[1] = ar->ip1\_b; ranges[2] = 1;ranges[1] = 0xffffffffffffff002; sranges[2] = 1;

/\* submit the address ranges for IPT tracing even if our target has compile-time instrumentations \*/
//if(!get\_harness\_state()->afl\_mode){
 kAFL hypercall(HYPERCALL KAFL RANGE SUBMIT, (uintptr t)ranges);

lm : 19.25%/53.2k, n/a

cpu000: 12%

## american fuzzy lop ++2.65d (libpng\_harness) [explore] {0}

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## cpu000: 12%



<ul> <li>Hard targets</li> <li>Usability gap</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Emulation based fuzzing tools</li> </ul>	- map coverage and out of data : 5.78% / 13.98%
• Elliuracion-based ruzzing coors	are out-or-date 3.30 bits/tuple
<ul> <li>We need something like "Step t in \$rdi, snapshot fuzz from he</li> </ul>	ill the break point, put the input re"

Ask more about fuzzing at <u>https://discord.gg/gCraWct</u>

overall results – cycles done : 15 total paths : 703 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0

cpu000: 12%

im : 19.25%/53.2k, n,

# Thanks y'all